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abstract
In this article, we discuss, from a complex systems perspective, possible implications of the rising de-
pendency between autonomous human social/individual action, ubiquitous computing, and artificial
intelligent systems. Investigation is made of ethical and political issues related to the application of ubiq-
uitous computing resources to autonomous decision-making processes and to the enhancement of hu-
man cognition and action. We claim that without the feedback of fellow humans, which teaches us the
consequences of our actions in real everyday life, the indiscriminate use of ubiquitous computing in
decision-making processes seems to be beyond the reach of any clear ethical control. We argue that the
complex systems perspective may help us to foresee possible long-term consequences of our choices, in
areas where human autonomous action can be directly affected by informational technologies.
Keywords ● Artificial intelligent systems. Autonomous decision-making. Complex systems. Systemic
compatibilism. Human enhancement. Self-organization. Ubiquitous computing.
Introduction
The rapid development of information technologies and their applications in human
life raises challenging questions concerning the near future not only of our species,
but also of the other animals that surround us. In industrialized societies, decision
processes are every day becoming more dependent on artificial intelligent systems;
they control airplanes, trains, production lines, electricity power stations, systems of
water distribution, and many other aspects of human life. Furthermore, the produc-
tion of the complex chips involved in the implementation of these intelligent systems
itself depends on the operation of artificial intelligent systems (Russell & Norvig, 2003).
In this context, what kind of (not too distant) future is unfolding on the horizon of
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human autonomous action? Who controls the abundant number of ubiquitous com-
puters spread around in our environment in the form of invisible cameras, electronic
tags, and so on? What are the advantages and disadvantages of the growing application
of information technologies to autonomous decision-making processes?
The above questions will be discussed from a complex systems perspective; they
provide the guiding lines of the present paper, which is organized in three sections.
In section 1, the topic of ubiquitous computing and human autonomous action is ad-
dressed. “Human autonomous action” shall be characterized here not in terms of the
absence of restrictions, but rather as actions performed in accordance with consen-
sual agreements established amongst social agents for the benefit of all. In section 2,
the concepts of ubiquitous computing and disguisers are investigated from the com-
plex systems perspective. Finally, in section 3, ethical and political implications of ap-
plied information technologies are discussed in the context of human autonomous
decision-making processes.
1 Ubiquitous computing and human autonomous action
In his paper “The computer for the 21st century”, Mark Weiser (1991) envisioned a
future in which computers disappear from our environment and from our sight, but
would still be present, interacting seamlessly with us, providing services and resources
for our activities that would be guided by artificial intelligent systems, although we would
not be aware of their presence. This scenario, common in most industrialized socie-
ties, brings us back to our initial questions concerning the possible future of human
autonomous action following the spread of ubiquitous computing, and the control of
information available from the myriads of invisible cameras, electronic tags, and many
other devices.
Considering that self-organizing processes constitute much of the dynamics of
ubiquitous computing, it does not seem plausible that the immense amount of infor-
mation, available for instance on the internet, could be controlled by any specific cen-
tral command. However, it is possible that outcomes of these self-organizing proc-
esses could be hetero-organized by a powerful supervisor – a sort of “big brother”.
In this case, a central controller could have access to metadata resulting from proc-
esses of compacting information available in ubiquitous computing, organized by in-
telligent search systems. These systems, in turn, by interfering with decision-making
processes, could slowly degrade human autonomy on many scales, varying from hu-
man health decisions to actions that are morally driven.
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As indicated above, autonomy is characterized here not in terms of the absence
of restrictions, but rather in accordance with consensual agreements established
amongst social agents for the benefit of all. In this sense, a human autonomous action
would, ideally, be part of (but not confused with) a self-organized system, in that it
would express spontaneous synergy with other moral actions.
Examples of practices that seem to affect decision-making processes are going
to be discussed in section 3, which addresses aspects of the human enhancement project
and the contemporary enterprises under development involving drones and robot kill-
ers, amongst others. In the present section, we introduce the main characteristics of
ubiquitous computing and disguisers that could help us to analyze some of these prac-
tices from a complex systems perspective.
Ubiquitous computing, as defined by Mark Weiser, is a system composed of two
parts: (1) computer and information systems, and (2) the human aspect. Ubiquity is an
attribute that arises from the interaction between these parts, and it is characterized
by the symbiotic nature of this association. On the one hand, humans benefit from
information processing and cognitive capabilities acquired from computer systems,
and, on the other hand, the computer systems benefit from the huge amounts of data
acquired from the pervasive sensors and cameras that continuously analyze contexts
and individual behaviors, which enhances their ubiquitous presence. In the case of
ubiquitous systems, humans have to learn how to access and use communication and
processing resources provided by computer systems; once learned, access and use be-
comes seamless and natural, no longer requiring any conscious effort. Computers in
ubiquitous systems need to remain always present, anywhere, anytime, dynamically
adapting to different contexts and human needs in order to provide communication
and information processing services for individuals. Implementation of these capa-
bilities sometimes requires people to carry smartphones or wearable computers, al-
though the communication and computer resources can also be present in the envi-
ronment, where they are pervasive and invisible in the streets, on the walls, and in
appliances, and are all connected in a single network. Figure 1 illustrates the two sides
of a ubiquitous computing system.
For ubiquity to work at its full capacity, users have to relinquish their privacy, at
least partially; in order to be prompt and useful, the computer system has to have ac-
cess to information about the individual’s habits, behavior, needs, and even idiosyn-
crasies. It has to be informed where the person is and where he/she is going to be in
order to analyze the context and local resources. In turn, users will have access to many
services: constant connection to their virtual or real social groups; instant access to
vast amounts of information, knowledge, and entertainment; recommendation serv-
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Figure 1. Ubiquitous computing system. It is a two parts system composed by a human side and a computer
side, interacting through many communication interfaces. The computer side provides the processing
power and access to data bases and communication networks, while capturing data from the user and his/
her environment through sensors. The human side provides the different inputs and his/her actions/
reactions from the environment for the computer side. The symbiotic nature of this system implies that
the communication interfaces between both sides takes a critical role. The humans need to develop
abilities to interact effortlessly with the computer side, and the computers need to learn the user’s
characteristics and idiosyncrasies. The resulting system enhances human information capabilities and
the computer side gains access to huge amount of personal data from the user and his/her environment.
(Image: Guiou Kobayashi.)
ices for goods, restaurants, and things to do, matching the present need and local con-
text; selected and pre-filtered news that suits their interests and tastes; and any other
future services that might arise from this large computer system.
One interesting ubiquitous service is the digital disguiser. The objective of a
disguiser is to change the physical characteristics of a person, their appearance, voice,
background scene, sounds, and so on, all in real time. This requires substantial image
processing and computer graphics power, as well as specialized software. Some of these
services are already available, such as real-time voice changers and background sound
generators. Disguisers differ from anonymizers (which enable changes of natural to
metallic voices, or the appearance of mosaic pixels over the face), because in the case
of disguisers the intention is to hide the change itself, so that the other side is unaware
that he/she is communicating with a different person. In the near future, when most
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social and group interactions will be mediated by ubiquitous computers, through so-
cial networking services such as Facebook or Orkut, digital disguisers could provide
very popular services with widespread uses. Of course, anyone sufficiently skilled can
disguise him/herself, given sufficient characterization and scenario, without the need
for a digital disguiser. However, ubiquitous computing can make this ability available
to anyone, anytime, hence universalizing its use. Figure 2 illustrates an interaction
between a disguiser and a real person.
In synthesis, ubiquitous computing and disguisers are important elements of
the unfolding informational technological universe that allows hyper-connectivity to
occur person-to-person, person-to-machine, and machine-to-machine, generating
a huge amount of data.
An interesting fact is that hyper-connectivity tends to increase the amount of
information available in a system, while the availability of machines and intelligent
systems tends to diminish the amount of autonomous decision-making in humans.
Considerations about this opposite tendency can be relevant to the analysis of autono-
Figure 2. Digital disguiser and its application. The figure presents two scenarios, without (1) and with a
disguiser system (2). The first scenario is a normal one, with two persons A and B interacting through a
computer system, like video conference or social media site. The second scenario represents a disguiser
system at work, with the same interaction between A and B but with another person C disguised as B, and
with A not aware of this. (Image: Guiou Kobayashi.)
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mous human decision processes, especially concerning “who controls what” in demo-
cratic collective actions.
Besides the availability of information regarding the object of decisions, demo-
cratic processes presuppose the absence of coercive forces in the choice of alternative
autonomous actions. The question that remains to investigate is whether the indis-
criminate dissemination of ubiquitous computing and of intelligent systems can play
the role of coercive forces that deter autonomous action.
By adopting Turing’s (1950) hypothesis concerning the algorithmic nature of
intelligence, traditional AI characterizes machine intelligence in terms of abstract
problem solving capacity in specific domains of competence. In the new scenario of
ubiquitous computing with hyper-connectivity, mobile machine intelligence is now
conceived as the self-organized capacity to establish connections with the surround-
ings in order to obtain information necessary for self-adaptation and achievement
of goals.
Specificities of the new 21st century scenario, involving the proliferation of ubiq-
uitous computing and intelligent systems with increasing degrees of autonomy and
hyper-connectivity, seems to require re-evaluation of ethical and political implica-
tions of collective decision processes.
A fundamental characteristic of the new scenario, where human society is inter-
mingled with ubiquitous computing and autonomous intelligent systems, is the di-
verse nature of its agents. This diversity gives place to an invisible complex system that
involves interactions amongst living beings and a myriad of artificial devices, diluting
the centralized computation that was dominant in the last century.
In the twentieth century, the development of powerful computers and PCs paved
the way to virtual realities in which humans could deliberately include themselves. In
contrast, nowadays ubiquitous computing is inserted in real life, sometimes covertly
restricting a certain degree of human autonomy. Paradoxically, this insertion of ubiq-
uitous computing into everyday life can provide a great amount of useful information
for the processes of decision-making. Ethical and political implications of such a trans-
formation are not well known in the context of human autonomous action, and diver-
gent opinions are available in different areas of investigation.
According to the complex systems perspective of human action proposed here,
there are ways of analyzing emergent properties of the interactions between agents and
their environment that allow the anticipation of possible types of conduct and their
probable future consequences. From this perspective, in what concerns human ac-
tion, autonomy may or may not be threatened, depending on the capacity of the agents
to understand the dynamics of the complex systems in which they form a part, and the
conceivable ways of altering (when necessary) the processes that govern such dynamics.
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In the next section, we discuss the properties of complex systems that seem
suitable for the study of autonomous action in the context of ubiquitous computing
and disguisers.
2 Ubiquitous computing and disguisers:
a view from the complex systems perspective
There seem to be three main approaches to complex systems that are of interest to the
present debate on the role of ubiquitous computing and disguisers in human autono-
mous action. The first, developed predominantly in the context of the social sciences
and humanities in general, emphasizes the roles of order, disorder, emergence, and
self-organization in the constitution of individual and collective action (Wiener, 1954,
1996; Morin, 2005; Debrun, 2009). The second approach, mainly applied to physics,
biology, engineering, and environmental sciences, deals with mathematical formalisms
that allow multiple-scale modeling of individual and collective phenomena constitu-
tive of adaptive systems. The third approach, predominant in cybernetics, informa-
tion sciences, cognitive sciences, and robotics, encompasses both previous ones in
the study of the dynamics of social webs, intelligent systems, and the behavior of un-
stable environments directly affected by information available at multiple scales
(Bourgine, 2013; Haken, 1988; Weaver, 2004 [1948]; Wiener, 1996).
Despite the differences in their focus of analysis, the above views share the gen-
eral hypothesis that:
A ‘complex system’ is a group or organization which is made up of many interact-
ing parts. (...) In such systems the individual parts - called ‘components’ or
‘agents’ - and the interactions between them often lead to large-scale behaviors
which are not easily predicted from a knowledge only of the behavior of the individual
agents (Mitchell & Newman, 2002, p. 1).
Another common assumption, as stressed by a document from Unesco (2011), is
that complex systems are multi-level reconfigurable systems situated in turbulent and
changing environments, adapting through internal and external dynamic interactions.
Their study involves scientific challenges related to the transversal theoretical ques-
tions raised by complex system science in relation to observation, prediction and man-
agement of their multi-scale dynamics. The challenges posed by the multi-scale
modeling of natural and artificial adaptive complex systems can only be met with new
collective strategies for interdisciplinary research and teaching.
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The emphasis on multiple-scale dynamics, an inherent characteristic of com-
plex systems, can be a promising hint in the study of ethical and political issues con-
cerning human decision making. It is known that many collaborative and social in-
sects exhibit a collective behavior that is much more complex and sophisticated than
the behavior of the single individuals. How does this “social intelligence” arise in these
colonies, and how is an individual autonomous action related to it? These are many of
the questions that might be answered through the study of complex networks. In the
case of humans, recent studies of social networks, especially those that are internet-
based, show us that their properties are best understood from the complex networks
perspective, rather than using traditional sociometric analysis.  Newman (2003)
presents many models of complex networks, bringing complex system tools and per-
spectives to the study of social networks.
The three main characteristics of complex systems that are of interest for the
present inquiry are:
(a) Self-organization. A process through which new forms of organiza-
tion emerge solely from the dynamic spontaneous interaction among ini-
tially independent elements, without any a priori plan or central control-
ler (cf. Ashby, 2004 [1962]; Foerster, 1960; Haken, 1988;  Debrun, 2009;
Kohonen, 1984; Kelso, 1994).
Self-organization may apply in different degrees to social, organic, and inor-
ganic processes that change from their initial conditions; the greater the gap between
the initial conditions and the current state of development of a system, the greater will
be its degree of self-organization (cf. Debrun, 2009). Thus, for example, a radical revo-
lution, instigated by citizens breaking down large parts of well-established habits in a
society, will present a higher degree of self-organization than a minor reform pro-
moted by these citizens.
Similarly, a self-organized neural network that adjusts the weightings of its
connections in accordance with local rules will present a lower degree of self-organiza-
tion than an autonomous self-organized robot that can learn and evolve, adjusting its
behaviour in response to certain tasks, initiating a secondary self-organized process.
In both situations, self-organization occurs without the predominant influence of a cen-
tral controller; its development happens mainly as an emergent property of the interac-
tions amongst its components, generating, at the macroscopic level, order parameters.
(b) Multiple-scale dynamics of order parameters. According to Haken,
order parameters (OP) are: “emergent properties of the dynamical inter-
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action amongst elements at the micro-level. When OP’s emerge, they en-
slave the behaviour of individual elements, producing new characteristics
at the macroscopic scale” (1988, p. 45).
In human collective actions, order parameters can emerge in the dynamics of
individual identity development. Thus, for example, an individual who belongs to an
activist group may have his/her identity altered by the influence of the emergent prod-
uct of his/her interactions with this group, affecting common habits, beliefs, tastes,
and ethical options.
(c) Emergence. This is the way that complex systems arise out of a multi-
plicity of self-organized interactions. It enables consideration of many
levels of dependency of interacting elements of a system.
In the context of ubiquitous computing and disguisers, self-organization, order
parameters, and emergence change dynamically as multifaceted social interactions
happen simultaneously in the virtual environment. These characteristics of complex
systems can be used to understand how the clusters of social networks are formed and
how individual behavior influences, and is influenced by, collective social behavior.
Ubiquitous computing and disguisers bring new dynamics – anywhere, anytime
– and multiple personalities and interactions to today’s already complex and far-flung
social networks. From a complex systems perspective, a possible answer to the initial
question concerning the perspectives for human autonomous action following the
spread of ubiquitous computing and disguisers could be that the rising dependency
between autonomous human social/individual action and artificial intelligent systems
may leave us with more free time to enjoy ourselves, without having to deal with bur-
densome and tedious tasks.  Disguisers could allow people to express themselves freely
without fear of collective punishment. Another possibility, not so positive, is that the
ubiquitous and indiscriminate use of artificial intelligent systems may slowly erode
our autonomy. There is indeed the possibility that these same “facilities” are already
enslaving us, reducing our possibilities of choice in many aspects of our autonomous
social/individual existence. Furthermore, the interaction with disguisers could
trivialize stable moral principles of honesty, transparency, and trust.
Given the existence of many different (and sometimes conflicting) views on this
issue, we are going to investigate, from an ethical perspective, advantages and disad-
vantages of the growing application of ubiquitous information technologies to human
decision-making processes, focusing on the topic of autonomy.
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3 Ethical and political implications
of applied information technologies
The analysis of ethical implications related to the indiscriminate use of applied infor-
mation technologies and the impact on decision-making processes faces what Beavers
calls the hard problem of ethics:
(...) after more than two millennia of moral inquiry, there is still no consensus
on how to determine moral right and wrong. Even though most mainstream moral
theories agree from a big picture perspective on which behaviors are morally per-
missible and which are not, there is little agreement on why they are so, that is,
what it is precisely about a moral behavior that makes it moral. For simplicity’s
sake, this question will be here designated as the hard problem of ethics. (Beavers,
2011, p. 2).
Beaver argues that even though there is a minimum general consensus about the
nature of meaningful moral conduct related to trust, self-sacrifice, altruism, loyalty,
and generosity, theories of moral conduct incorporate several different values and prin-
ciples considered morally meaningful in relation to human action.
It could be pointed out, for example, that according to deontological concep-
tions (Kant, 1997 [1775]) agents should act morally, guided by the universal duty of
cooperating for the general benefit of society. In contrast, customary ethics (Pascal,
1963) presupposes that moral agents should respect collective habits that have his-
torically been successful. Also, according to utilitarian ethics, the validity of an action
should be evaluated in terms of the results it produces in the lives of people affected by
it (Bentham, 1907).
Thus, for instance, according to deontological ethics it is not permitted to lie,
because human society would collapse if this practice became generalized and was
adopted by all citizens. From this perspective, use of disguisers would be wrong, be-
cause it would be grounded in a type of lie concerning the real identity of an agent.
However, it could be argued that this practice might have positive aspects in a totalitar-
ian State that forced individuals to hide their expression of democratic values; a dis-
guised person could transmit democratic values without being immediately punished
or repressed.
It seems that according to deontological ethics, this type of situation would indi-
cate a bottleneck resulting from the universal moral imperative that imposes the moral
law independent of specific contexts. In this case, a possible contribution of the com-
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plex systems view to elucidate this situation would include other elements in the analysis
of the situation: deontological ethics stresses the logical aspects of possible conse-
quences of the generalization of lies, disregarding historical circumstances. By ampli-
fying the scales of contexts in which lies could be accepted, the systemic analysis takes
into account the dynamics of contextual circumstances related to the usage of disguisers.
By adopting a compatibilist view, this strategy would consider the universal moral im-
perative as an important guiding principle that could, nevertheless, be adjusted to spe-
cific historical contexts without introducing moral relativism.
From the customary ethics perspective, the usage of disguisers may be incom-
patible with fundamental collective habits related to mutual trust, such as those that
have historically prevented society engaging in deep social quarrels. Due to its incom-
patibility with fundamental habits, the use of disguisers can hardly generate a morally
acceptable customary rule. Possible positive benefits of disguisers in specific circum-
stances should be considered individually, case-by-case, with the risk of arbitrariness.
We understand that in the systemic approach, arbitrariness could be investigated by
modeling the usage of types of situations in which disguisers could be morally accept-
able. In this way, situations in which there were positive uses of disguisers could be
detected, preserving social synergy.
Utilitarianism, in turn, considers valuable actions that show a tendency to in-
crease the happiness of those whose interests are at stake (Bentham, 1907). In this
approach, the usage of disguisers should be evaluated in terms of the results it pro-
duces in the lives of people affected by it. However, one of the main criticisms directed
towards utilitarianism arises from the difficulty of assessing what actions effectively
express the tendency to promote the common good in different contexts and time-
frames. Here also, the approach of complex systems offers the possibility of modeling
different scenarios that could assist in evaluating conceivable social consequences of
the use of technologies such as disguisers, especially those of long-term duration. The
complex systems view could also help with the analysis of problems concerning politi-
cal implications of the indiscriminate use of disguisers and ubiquitous computing and
their impacts on collective decision-making processes, especially those related with
the so-called Reason of State (as outlined by Korab-Karpowicz, 2013). Reason of State is
the government process of decision-making that gives priority to national interests
and practical results, without taking into consideration ethical principles, and is pre-
dominant in contemporary societies.
In human relations, moral laws in common and professional ethics offer crite-
ria for differentiating licit from illicit actions. However, in political contexts there is
a certain opposition (or independence) between morals and politics (Bobbio, 2000,
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p. 177), due to the fact that the specificity of the modern State forces it to adopt the logic
of Reason of State. Thus, for example, military use of artificial systems such as drones
and robot killers1 provides an illustration of the predominance of Reason of State in
the collective process of decision-making, even though the activity in question may be
in direct opposition to ethical concepts of human rights.
From the reasons presented so far, we understand that classical ethical approaches,
such as those outlined above, have to be complemented in order to deal with the conse-
quences of moral actions intermingled with contemporary information technologies.
Accepting for the time being that traditional Ethics does not provide sufficient
conceptual tools to deal with contemporary ethical and political implications of the
generalized use of ubiquitous computing, disguisers, and IT technologies, the remain-
ing question is: what are the alternative views that may help with the understanding of
current ethical problems? Our suggestion is that even though the complex systems view
may not be able to solve this difficult kind of problem, its conceptual assumptions might
help us to start a promising strategy of investigation. The advantage of this approach is
that it does not exclude the previous ones, but includes them in a cooperative manner
whenever they seem to make sense in specific embodied embedded situations.
The main difficulty with this suggestion is to avoid undesirable relativism, which
would undermine the entire investigation. However, the proposed view expresses a
type of systemic compatibilism that could bring about relevant information available in
specific situations, amplifying the number of possibilities in the processes of autono-
mous human decision-making.
To illustrate the possible advantages of adopting systemic compatibilism, let us
consider another example of possible limitations of traditional ethics in dealing with
contemporary moral and political actions. This may be elucidated by the example of
the human enhancement project known as Transhumanism. According to proponents
of Transhumanism (Bostron, 2003, 2006; Kurzweil, 2005; de Grey & Rae, 2007), the
current human condition can be enhanced by means of drugs and information tech-
nology tools that might amplify cognitive, emotional, and moral human capabilities.
The hope of the transhumanists is that, in a near future, the human nervous sys-
tem could be connected to mechanical implants (such as artificial mechanical limbs,
nanorobots, new human-machine interfaces, amongst others), and that these gadgets
would lead to:
1 A drone is an unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV), also known as a combat drone, usually armed and often utilized
for military goals, and is remotely controlled by humans (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Combat_drone). Killer ro-
bots, under development, are autonomous artificial systems that might be able to select and to engage targets with-
out human intervention (http://www.hrw.org/topic/arms/killer-robots).
173
Complexity and information technologies...
scientiæ zudia, São Paulo, v. 12, special issue, p. 161-79, 2014
(1) promotion of the human common good;
(2) enhancement of emotional and cognitive human capacities, and
(3) development of individual and social habits that could contribute to
the overcoming of human conflicts.
Considering points (1)-(3), deontological, utilitarian, and customary ethical
approaches might possibly approve the trans-humanist project (at least in principle),
occasionally allowing minor criticisms aimed at its mode of implementation.
In contrast, complex systems analysis of the human enhancement project would
consider several levels of inquiry, including: (i) the long-term ecological scale of evo-
lution of self-organized living beings, and the emergence of their cognitive and emo-
tional abilities; (ii) the multiple-scale dynamics of organization of living beings that
varies from molecular structures to the ecological scale of the myriads of existing em-
bodied and embedded organisms.
Careful analysis of (i) and (ii) might lead to the anticipation of difficult prob-
lems related with the development of the human enhancement project. For example,
the consumption of drugs, initially aimed at promoting moral enhancement, could lead
to the emergence of undesirable individual and collective emotions. Furthermore, the
incorporation of nano-robots into molecular structures might interfere in an unpre-
dictable way with the delicate neural-dynamics at its emergent level of organization.
Despite the positive aspects and the good intentions underlying the trans-hu-
manist project, the enhancement of humans in isolation from other living beings and
their environment could disrupt the self-organized evolutionary chain, as conceived
nowadays, without any clear notion of the effects of this disruption.
As indicated in section 2, new forms of organization may emerge in complex sys-
tems from the dynamic interaction among independent elements without any central
controller, by means of training and refined adjustment. If it is assumed that the self-
organized dynamics of living beings results from long-lasting co-evolutionary adap-
tive interactions between organisms and their environment, then it could be that hu-
man enhancement technologies might transform the self-organized co-evolutionary
processes into hetero-organized ones. These hetero-organized processes would be
controlled by a small group of scientists and technicians, directing evolution of the
human species in accordance with their own criteria. Such criteria would, in princi-
ple, be fallible.
The complex systems perspective presented here also allows a broader under-
standing of possible implications of the generalized use of digital technologies in hu-
man individual and collective actions. On one hand, there are immediate advantages
of ubiquitous computing; smart meters can be used to optimize energy consumption at
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home, and encyclopedic information is easily accessible from the internet, liberating
individuals from the need to memorize multifarious data. Furthermore, Massive Open
On-line Courses (MOOC) may help with the eradication of inequalities between the
poor and the rich in educational matters. From this point of view, the individual’s de-
cision-making process may become less reactive and more autonomous. On the other
hand, the generalized use of smart meters may generate a huge amount of data about
the personal interests and habits of individuals, which are out of their control and could
be used against them in the future. The same could occur with internet search tools
that record private information without any control or consent.
Concluding remarks
The invention of combustion engines was possibly one of the major causes of the suc-
cess of industrial production in human history. Heavy agricultural machines, farm trac-
tors, trains, and trucks, amongst others, have dramatically improved productivity. Air-
craft, tanks, ships, and weapons demonstrate the staggering increase in the destructive
power of machines. In all these areas, the control of technological processes has, in
general, been in the hands of humans. The novelty now is that the new computational
technologies are slowly changing the way in which these processes are controlled, and
not only in the case of productive processes.
A great technological advance occurred with the creation of intelligent networks
with the ability to adapt to environmental changes in order to improve their per-
formance as a function of available data. New cognitive networks have the capacity to
learn how to plan, in a proactive way, in order to face tough future conditions. What
matters now in industrialized societies is the increasing degree of autonomy of com-
putational devices in relation to the control of processes of material production.
In this context, a question of interest to the present investigation consists in what are
the possible implications of using autonomous artificial systems, such as killer robots,
in conflict situations.
The use of remotely guided drones in the theatre of war raises not only the moral
problem of killing at a distance without bearing the local consequences, but also of
unfairly extending the area of conflict. Langdon Winner (1980) argues that techno-
logical artifacts have a great impact in the process of settling social affairs, therefore
embodying social relations. He also claims that technologies are ways of building or-
der in our world.
Following Winner’s path, it is possible to conceive technologies that result from
a process of secondary self-organization (as indicated in section 2), in that they learn
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to adjust their behavior with some degree of autonomy, building a particular type of
organization in our world. In this scenario, new weapons may be rendering obsolete
the traditional role of military divisions, greatly reducing the autonomy of their hu-
man warriors and catapulting the lethal power of destruction of increasingly autono-
mous systems.
Supporters of autonomous artificial systems promise to solve immediate prob-
lems, such as the possibility of remote destruction of the enemy’s weapons. However,
in the longer term, the increasing autonomy of these systems could lead to a propor-
tional loss of human autonomy. A gradual loss of the ability of autonomous decision-
making (so dear to our species) would occur in situations involving political dilemmas
and ethical conflicts.
In the nineteenth century, when machines started to be introduced into indus-
trial production lines, there was a strong reaction from the working classes, motivated
by the fear that the installation of machines would cause massive unemployment.
After almost two centuries, there is historical evidence to indicate that there were, in
fact, higher rates of unemployment in countries that only imported these kinds of ma-
chines. However, in countries that produced their own machines to substitute the work-
ers on the production lines, new industries were installed to manufacture innovative
types of machines. The initial unemployment therefore decreased, and better quali-
fied workers were employed in new areas of industry.
The supposition that the same logic might apply to the introduction of new elec-
tronic devices involved in the creation of ubiquitous computing seems reasonable.
Societies that only import ubiquitous computing technologies will experience a high
rate of unemployment, but those that produce their own technology will have new de-
mands for more qualified workers.
So, in relation to the impact on the general workforce, ubiquitous computing
will probably not bring any significant novelty. However, a different logic might apply
to workers in areas that involve decision making; whenever new intelligent machines
are created, fewer individuals will be required to make decisions concerning the ex-
ecution of their tasks. If this reasoning is correct, then the dissemination of ubiqui-
tous computing will generate a qualitative change in the composition of the workforce
in almost all areas of human society.
In industrialized countries, the automation of banking systems has drastically
reduced the number of employees, and most people seem to have approved of this
change. However, serious problems might arise should this kind of qualitative change
occur in other sensitive areas of society, such as the intelligence agencies. If collective
information were to be placed under the control of a small, undemocratic, group of
persons, then the privacy of citizens might be threatened. Given that there is no free-
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dom without safeguards of the privacy of individuals and companies, the possibility
exists of the emergence of a totalitarian state.
Finally, in the context of the logic of the Reason of State, some ethical and politi-
cal consequences can be considered that might derive from the generalized use of con-
temporary informational technologies and human enhancement. For instance, what
can be done with all the data collected by the internet, smart meters, sensors, and so
on? At least three possibilities can be conceived:
Possibility 1. In societies governed by non-authoritarian forces, privacy
is respected; ubiquitous computing and the techniques of human radical
enhancement are applied in accordance with the autonomous person’s
free will.
Possibility 2. In societies governed by authoritarian forces, control over
society is amplified; ubiquitous computing and techniques of human radi-
cal enhancement prevent self-organization, otherness, and democratic
ways of existing from flourishing.
Possibility 3. A small technocracy of controlling computers renders hu-
mans a useless weight. Complex chips and intelligent systems are imple-
mented mainly with the help of these same intelligent systems. With the
increasing automation of the production of intelligent systems, there is
an exponential increase in the capacity of these systems to make decisions.
Given human history, the realization of Possibility 1 seems to require something
equivalent to the Kantian moral imperative, applied to privacy, which would function as
a regulator of society. This idealized society would produce laws according to its own prin-
ciples, practicing the notion of collective freedom and expressing individual autonomy.
Possibility 2 represents, to different degrees, societies dominated by financial
lobbies and powerful private organizations that use Reason of State logic to impose
their economic interests upon society. As the will of the individual is suppressed by the
action of these powerful organizations, social processes of self-regulation become se-
riously affected. Ethical implications of this type of domination are mainly due to po-
litical causes rather than technological ones. Long-term systemic analysis indicates
that societies characterized by the predominance of Possibility 2 can be transformed
into societies where Possibility 3 predominates. In this scenario, self-organized ac-
tive participation of citizens could be transformed into heteronomous patterns of ac-
tions technologically directed. As suggested by Winner, “with the overload of informa-
tion so monumental, possibilities once crucial to citizenship are neutralized. Active
participation is replaced by a haphazard monitoring” (1978, p. 296).
177
Complexity and information technologies...
scientiæ zudia, São Paulo, v. 12, special issue, p. 161-79, 2014
With increasing informatization of control processes, Possibility 3 models a so-
ciety in which a technocrat elite is in charge of the decision-making processes. In prin-
ciple, the inability of such an elite to manipulate society might produce revolutions
aspiring for greater democracy in government, individual autonomy, and collective
freedom. If such democratic revolutions do not occur, then ethical implications of the
scientific and technological progress might be gloomy.
The complex systems strategies presented here to investigate the above issues
concerning human autonomy open up a line of reflection whose ultimate direction is
uncertain; its definition will depend on the feedback provided by social and environ-
mental factors. Our hope is that individual and collective active engagement in politi-
cal and ethical debate could bring about new forms of organization to feed and keep
alive the human capacity for autonomous action.
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